There may be uncertainty about what will be changed and when, but there is no doubt that there will be turnover among senior staff at regulatory agencies. In addition to President Trump's appointments to lead the Treasury Department, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), the incoming administration will also be able to nominate new heads of the banking authorities, namely the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. (FDIC) , and the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, all within the next 18 months. More specifically, three new commissioners, the maximum allowed from any one political party, will be nominated for both the SEC and the CFTC. The terms for current leadership of the OCC, the FDIC and the Federal Reserve expire in April 2017, November 2017, and February 2018, respectively. The key position of vice chairman for supervision also is vacant at the Fed. The diagram below provides an overview of the U.S. financial regulatory structure. It shows that these changes will affect the entire financial sector, including banks, insurance companies, financial market utilities (FMUs), and securities markets. Furthermore, seven of the 10 voting members of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), which coordinates U.S. macroprudential policy, will be replaced. These new regulators will have substantial authority, both as individual agency chiefs and as members of the FSOC, to change the way DoddFrank is applied. They can do this without going through Congress or even adjusting their own formal rule-making processes. For example, agency chiefs can change enforcement priorities by "amending or rescinding and replacing related guidance, such as interpretations of rules, internal policies and manuals." provide regulatory relief to the financial sector without altering the formal rules. In that context, the following are potential targets for early change:
• The FSOC's authority to designate "systemically important" nonbank institutions (FMUs, including clearing organizations and payment systems, and nonbank financial companies) has been criticized and challenged, most notably in the FSOC's recision of GE Capital's designation as systemically important last year. New voting FSOC members may simply choose not to designate new systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) and reverse existing designations. As a result, nonbank companies would no longer be subject to enhanced Fed supervision. The FSOC may also shift its attention away from asset managers to focus on streamlining regulations across agencies instead of creating new regulations.
• The SEC and the CFTC are likely to limit the scope of future securities regulations. This includes current efforts to regulate high-frequency trading and security-based swaps. Furthermore, the issuance of fiduciary rules for financial advisers and rules for asset manager stress testing will not remain a priority for the SEC. Both agencies may emphasize penalties against individuals rather than against corporations in an effort to hold individuals accountable. The result would be more civil and criminal prosecutions for fraud and self-dealing.
• The FDIC is currently the "orderly liquidation authority" under Title II of Dodd-Frank and, as such, it can theoretically liquidate a SIFI in difficulty outside of the normal bankruptcy code. However, the FDIC can act only after the secretary of the treasury decides to place the SIFI under FDIC receivership. This procedure has never been used, and it seems rather unlikely that it will be under the new administration. The potential amendment of the federal bankruptcy code to facilitate procedures when it comes to SIFIs is directly related to this point.
• Banking organizations may benefit from an increase in Dodd-Frank's $50 billion asset threshold, which automatically designates them as SIFIs and subjects them to higher supervision standards.
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The Fed proposed in September 2016 to exempt the capital plans of smaller banks from scrutiny testing under Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) stress testing and resolution planning.
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The increase in the threshold has bipartisan support; however, it would have limited impact because banking agencies have already eased regulatory pressure for banks with less than $100 billion in assets.
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Similar easing seems rather unlikely for the largest banks in the short term, but they may benefit from potential changes or further delay in the implementation of the Volcker Rule's limits on proprietary trading. Concerns regarding the rule's complexity as well as its impact on market liquidity are widespread, which may explain the recurring postponement of its full implementation. The new deadline for conformance is July 2017.
• The CFPB's leadership structure has often been called into question, especially since November 2016, when a federal court ruled it unconstitutional because its single director can be removed only "for cause" during his five-year term. Changes will be likely if the CFPB's appeal fails.
To sum up, more than six years after the advent of Dodd-Frank, many are calling for a reassessment to ease the burden it places on financial-services companies, especially banks. The softened rhetoric of the new administration is quite different from the aggressive calls for repeal that were common during the 9 A Banking Organization is defined to include 1) insured depository institutions 2) bank holding and savings and loan companies and 3) all companies that are treated as bank holding companies under the International Banking Act. 10 See https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2016/09/30/2016-23629/amendments-to-the-capital-plan-and-stress-testrules 11 See https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20140508a.htm campaign, and suggests a more subtle approach to regulatory change. This new tack also is more in line with the broader international debate. The pressure for regulatory change is not confined to the U.S. The latest delays in the finalization of Basel III's banking rules show that the post-crisis regulatory framework itself is under scrutiny.
